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Abstract
International calls have been made for reasoning-and-proving to permeate school mathematics. It is important that efforts to heed this call are
grounded in an understanding of the opportunities to reason- and-prove
that already exist, especially in secondary-level geometry where reasoningand-proving opportunities are prevalent but not thoroughly studied. This
analysis of six secondary-level geometry textbooks, like studies of other textbooks, characterizes the justifications given in the exposition and the reasoning-and-proving activities expected of students in the exercises. Furthermore, this study considers whether the mathematical statements included
in the reasoning-and-proving opportunities are general or particular in nature. Findings include the fact that the majority of expository mathematical
statements were general, whereas reasoning-and-proving exercises tended
to involve particular mathematical statements. Although reasoning-andproving opportunities were relatively numerous, it remained rare for the
reasoning-and-proving process itself to be an explicit object of reflection.
Relationships between these findings and the necessity principle of pedagogy are discussed.
Published in Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 16 (2014), pp 51–79.
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Although the process of reasoning-and-proving is an integral component of mathematics (Hanna, 1995, 2000; Hersh, 2009), it has not
been successfully integrated into students’ school mathematics experiences (Stylianou, Blanton, & Knuth, 2009). In the United States and
Canada, for example, explicit attention to reasoning-and-proving is
largely confined to a single geometry course at the secondary level
(Hanna & de Bruyn, 1999; Herbst, 2002). The situation is similar in
countries such as Taiwan and Germany (Heinze et al., 2008), although
the age at which students experience geometry may vary. When one
construes reasoning-and-proving1 as a multifaceted process of making, refining, and justifying mathematical claims, the present isolation
of reasoning-and-proving to geometry runs contrary to international
recommendations for reasoning-and-proving to be present throughout the school mathematics curriculum (e.g., Ministry of Education,
Science and Technology, 2011; National Council of Teachers of Mathematics [NCTM], 2000, 2009). Recently, in the United States, which
is the context for the present study, the Common Core State Standards
for Mathematics (National Governors Association & Council of Chief
State School Officers, 2010) identified the construction of viable arguments and the critiquing of others’ reasoning as a key mathematical practice that should be developed with students at all levels. Underlying these recommendations are assumptions that link students’
reasoning-and-proving experiences to their appreciation of its role
in mathematics (Lampert, 1990; NCTM, 2000) as well as the development of deeper conceptual understanding of mathematical content
(de Villiers, 1995; Dreyfus, 1999).
In conjunction with policy documents calling for an expanded role
of reasoning-and-proving, the international research community has
also identified reasoning-and-proving as an area of focus (Hanna &
de Villiers, 2008). In the United States, researchers have begun examining written curriculum materials to determine the extent and
1 We join Stylianides (2009) in using the term “reasoning-and-proving” to refer
broadly to processes of conjecturing and justification that are meant to articulate a mathematical statement and convince oneself or others of its truth-value,
wherein the justification or reasons given are acceptable to a particular classroom community if not the formal mathematical community. We use the term
“mathematical proof” or “proof” to mean an explicit and deductive argument
that would be accepted as valid by mathematicians knowledgeable in the particular content area.
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nature of reasoning-and-proving opportunities outside geometry.
In particular, textbook studies have been conducted for the primary
grades (Bieda, Drwencke, & Picard, in press), for the middle grades
(Stylianides, 2009), for secondary integrated textbooks (Davis, 2010),
and for a variety of secondary algebra and pre-calculus textbooks
(Thompson, Senk, & Johnson, 2012). Taken together, these studies
confirm that there is a scarcity of opportunities outside geometry for
U.S. students to engage in or reflect on reasoning-and-proving. Similar results have been found with Canadian and Australian textbooks
(Hanna & de Bruyn, 1999; Vincent & Stacey, 2008).
Although written curriculum materials are certainly not the sole
influence on students’ educational experiences in school mathematics, they are an important one (Cohen, Raudenbush, & Ball, 2003;
Grouws, Smith, & Sztajn, 2004), which makes these textbook analyses a key step toward better understanding the current state of reasoning-and-proving opportunities and informing efforts to infuse reasoning-and-proving throughout the school curriculum. By omitting
the secondary geometry course from analysis, however, these studies did not examine reasoning-and-proving where it is most prevalent. Moreover, textbook studies that have been situated in geometry
(e.g., Öner, 2008, 2009) did not focus on reasoning-and-proving generally but, rather, focused on reasoning-and-proving as it specifically
related to the use of dynamic geometry software. As the mathematics education community works to incorporate reasoning-and-proving throughout the school mathematics curriculum, it is important to
not only look forward to the domains where reasoning-and-proving
opportunities might be added but also to look back and reflect carefully on the nature of reasoning-and-proving opportunities that already exist. The present study promotes such reflection by characterizing the nature and extent of reasoning-and-proving opportunities
in secondary geometry textbooks.

Background
Research on Students’ Reasoning-and-Proving
For decades, students have had difficulty producing written proofs at
both the secondary (Bell, 1976; Healy & Hoyles, 2000; Martin & Kelly,
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1998; Porteous, 1990; Senk, 1985; TIMSS, 1998) and university (Recio
& Godino, 2001; Weber, 2001) levels. One of the most commonly reported issues is students’ misuse of empirical examples2 in the reasoning-and-proving process (Bieda, 2010; Bieda, Holden, & Knuth, 2006;
Chazan, 1993; Harel & Sowder, 2007). In some studies, when students were asked to deduce a result, they instead provided an inductive argument using examples or diagrams that did not adequately
address the generality of the mathematical claim (Healy & Hoyles,
2000; Martin & Harel, 1989; Williams, 1980). In other studies, students
were found to be convinced by empirical evidence that mathematical results were true (Harel & Sowder, 2007; Sowder & Harel, 1998)
and unconvinced by deductive forms of reasoning (Fischbein, 1982;
Fujita, Jones, & Kunimune, 2009; Healy & Hoyles, 2000), in the latter
case often failing to recognize that no further verifications were required once a correct deductive argument had been given. This constitutes a troubling reversal of logic as many students believe that a
handful of confirming examples can establish the general truth of a
mathematical result, whereas a deductive proof only establishes the
truth of a single case, namely, “the case that is pictured in the associated diagram” (Chazan, 1993, p. 362).
Findings related to these two difficulties—struggling to produce
proofs and misusing inductive arguments—are potentially linked in
that, when asked to write a proof, students may be unable to do so
at the moment and thus revert to an inductive argument rather than
provide no response. Therefore, an inductive response does not necessarily imply that the student viewed it as a valid mathematical proof.
Some studies, however, have taken up directly the question of students’ conceptions of the nature of reasoning-and-proving. For example, Herbst and Brach (2006) interviewed geometry students (14–15
years old) who reported that the purpose of reasoning-and-proving
was to allow them to demonstrate their reasoning and communication
2 We note that the empirical problem being described here has to do with the inappropriate use of inductive arguments to “prove” a general statement that requires a deductive justification. For example, it would be inappropriate to use 1
+ 3 = 4 and 3 + 5 = 8 to “prove” that the sum of any two odd numbers is even. We
do not mean to imply that there is no role for empirical reasoning in the reasoning-and-proving process. In fact, we agree with Polya (1959, 1981) that empirical reasoning is central to the formulation of conjectures and with Lakatos (1976)
that empirical reasoning is central to the refinement of definitions and theorems.
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skills, rather than to verify claims or develop mathematical understanding. These results were confirmed by Soucy McCrone and Martin (2009) who also interviewed and observed geometry students,
finding that they viewed the purpose of proof to be the application
of recently learned theorems—not a mathematical process for establishing the truth of theorems. Elsewhere, geometry students were
found to view deductive argumentation as an arbitrary exercise in
logic that merely confirms what is already known to be true (Schoenfeld, 1988; Tinto, 1988).
These findings highlight the potential danger of students viewing
reasoning-and-proving as an unnecessary or arbitrary exercise imposed on them by a teacher or textbook. Such conceptions of mathematical activities have been shown to be detrimental to students’
subsequent learning of mathematics (Muis, 2004). Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that much of this research was conducted with students
in or beyond secondary geometry (e.g., Chazan, 1993; Herbst &
Brach, 2006; Selden & Selden, 2003; Soucy McCrone & Martin, 2009).
In other words, the relatively extensive reasoning-and-proving experiences that students have in geometry do not seem to alleviate
the known difficulties—in fact, it is possible that some problematic
conceptions of reasoning-and-proving are specifically related to experiences in geometry.
Theoretical Perspective
The research described previously suggests that students’ difficulties
with reasoning-and-proving are not likely to be alleviated through
mere exposure to deductive reasoning opportunities or various reasoning-and-proving activities (e.g., conjecturing, finding counterexamples). Instead, we must carefully consider the nature of the exposure and the mathematical context of the reasoning-and-proving
activities. This study, therefore, focuses on students’ “opportunities to
learn” (Floden, 2002; Husen, 1967) to reason-and-prove that are embedded in the textbooks they use. We recognize that curriculum materials represent only one component of these opportunities to learn
and that teachers have a more central role in shaping students’ experiences through enactment (Tarr, Chavez, Reys, & Reys, 2006). Nevertheless, curriculum materials have been studied in relation to student
learning (Shield & Dole, 2013), are a direct source of student tasks
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and homework assignments, and communicate to students in various
ways (Herbel-Eisenman, 2007). Curriculum materials also shape what
teachers do in the classroom (Grouws et al., 2004; McCrory, Francis,
& Young, 2008), thereby indirectly influencing student learning (Cohen et al., 2003; Ni & Cai, 2011). Taken together, this suggests that it
is reasonable to assume textbooks play an integral part in students’
experiences with reasoning-and-proving.
Examinations of the reasoning-and-proving opportunities in textbooks can be aided and informed by the necessity principle. Harel and
Tall (1991) identified the necessity principle as a standard for pedagogy that involves presenting subject matter in a way that encourages learners to see its intellectual necessity, “[f]or if students do not
see the rationale for an idea, the idea would seem to them as being
evoked arbitrarily; it does not become a concept of the students” (p.
41, emphasis in original). The necessity principle, then, is based on
the notion that it is beneficial for students to engage with the intellectual underpinnings of a topic rather than as outsiders to the topic. In
drawing on the necessity principle for a textbook analysis, we recognize not only the textbook’s influence on classroom teaching, but also
the direct pedagogical relationship between the text and the student.
Furthermore, textbooks are often based on design principles (Hirsch,
2007) that are reflected in the embedded opportunities to learn, and
the necessity principle can be used as a lens for interpreting those opportunities, even though teachers do not necessarily enact written materials as designed (Stein, Remillard, & Smith, 2007).
There are several studies that suggest the necessity principle is often not being met with respect to reasoning-and-proving. First, Tinto’s
(1988) finding that geometry students viewed reasoning-and-proving as an arbitrary exercise imposed on them by an outside authority,
such as a teacher or textbook, may be evidence that they did not see
the intellectual need for deductive forms of reasoning. Second, many
students do not recognize when deduction is required to establish a
result with certainty (Harel & Sowder, 2007; Porteous, 1990; Williams,
1980). Third, students who still entertain the possibility of finding a
counterexample after seeing a correct deductive argument (Chazan,
1993; Fischbein, 1982; Healy & Hoyles, 2000) may be failing to grasp
the intellectual link between deduction and general claims. Furthermore, the finding that students view reasoning-and-proving as the
application of theorems, rather than a means of establishing truth or
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generating knowledge (Herbst & Brach, 2006; Soucy McCrone & Martin, 2009), suggests these students may not yet perceive the intellectual role of reasoning-and-proving in mathematics.
In addition to providing an interpretive lens for these past findings, the necessity principle may guide the design of opportunities
to learn that may move students beyond an empirical proof scheme
(Harel & Sowder, 2007) toward recognizing the need for deductive
reasoning when establishing truth for an infinite number of cases.
Indeed, instructional sequences and strategies have been developed
(e.g., Buchbinder & Zaslavsky, 2011; Stylianides & Stylianides, 2009)
to facilitate the intellectual transition from a sole reliance on empirical reasoning to the use and understanding of inductive and deductive reasoning together within the reasoning-and-proving process.
Although it is an important first step to help students become aware
of times when inductive reasoning is appropriate (e.g., developing
conjectures) and when it is inappropriate (e.g., validating statements
about infinitely many objects), the necessity principle pushes us further. We must also provide opportunities for students to see that deductive reasoning is necessitated by the situations in which inductive
reasoning falters. Such understanding of deductive reasoning is especially crucial in mathematics because mathematics deals with general
claims about entire, often infinite, classes of objects, and such claims
can only be verified with certainty by deductive means.
In this study, we build on past research in two significant ways.
First, we examine reasoning-and-proving in secondary-level geometry textbooks to complement the past work conducted in other areas and levels of mathematics. Second, we consider not only the frequency and type of reasoning-and-proving opportunities but also
the nature of the mathematical statements around which reasoningand-proving takes place, thus refining existing analytic frameworks
for textbook analysis. The research questions that guided the analyses were as follows:
RQ1. What is the nature and extent of reasoning-and-proving opportunities contained in secondary-level geometry
textbooks?
RQ2. How do the reasoning-and-proving opportunities in geometry textbook exposition compare to the opportunities in
student exercises?
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The context in which we address these questions is U.S. textbooks,
but it is likely that other national contexts have similar kinds of reasoning-and-proving opportunities, even if they are not in the same
proportions, and the broader issues related to our analytic framework
and the ways in which these opportunities may necessitate deductive
forms of reasoning are international in scope.

Method
Sample
This study involved six U.S. textbooks (see Table 1) designed for
stand-alone geometry courses for students approximately 13–16 years
old. The textbook series from which these geometry texts were drawn
constitute the mathematics textbooks used by nearly 90% of the secondary population in the United States (Dossey, Halvorsen, & Soucy
McCrone, 2008). We have intentionally refrained from characterizing
any of these textbooks at the onset of the study (e.g., as traditional or
reform), although it may be appropriate to draw distinctions between
textbooks based on the results of our analysis. It should be noted,
however, that there is variation among the authors’ and publishers’
Table 1. Geometry Textbooks Analyzed in This Study
Title

Publisher

Authors

Year

Geometry (CME)

Pearson

CME Project

2009

Geometry (Glencoe)
Glencoe McGraw Hill
		

Carter, Cuevas, Day,
Malloy, & Cummins

2010

Geometry (Holt)
Holt McDougal
		
		

Burger, Chard, Kennedy,
Leinwand, Renfro, Roby,
Seymour, & Waits

2011

Discovering Geometry
(Key)

Serra

2008

Geometry (Prentice)
Pearson Prentice Hall
		

Bass, Charles, Hall,
Johnson, & Kennedy

2009

Geometry (UCSMP)

Benson, Klein, Miller,
2009
Capuzzi-Feuerstein, 		
Fletcher, Marino, Powell,
Jakucyn, & Usiskin

Key Curriculum Press

Wright Group
McGraw Hill
		
		

Note: For clarity, the term in parentheses next to the title is used to refer to each textbook.
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goals for the textbooks as stated in their prefaces and introductions.
Because we are examining the opportunities made available to students directly by the textbook, rather than opportunities in classroom
enactment, we restricted our analysis to student editions of these textbook series. Although teacher’s materials may provide important support for the way in which student materials are interpreted or enacted
by teachers, and thus have been used informatively in some textbook
analyses (e.g., Stylianides, 2009), we believe a teacher’s enactment is
not solely determined by the teacher’s materials and so chose to code
only the student edition.
Also excluded from analysis were supplementary activities such
as “Activity Labs,” “Explorations,” “Projects,” or additional materials
available through the publisher’s websites. Admittedly, some of these
supplements did relate to reasoning-and-proving, but we excluded
this material from analysis because it would be unwise to attempt to
capture it all and difficult to know where to draw the line within the
supplementary materials. Thus, this study does not characterize the
entirety of each textbook series’ geometry content but rather its canonical student edition lessons, described next. We believe this scope
is meaningful because authors and publishers made decisions about
what reasoning-and-proving opportunities to include in canonical
lessons and which opportunities to place elsewhere.
All six textbooks contained numbered sections within each chapter and these sections contained expository text as well as student exercises. We refer to these textbook sections as lessons and they constituted the primary data of this study. Stratified random sampling
was used to select the lessons for analysis, with the textbook chapters
serving as strata. The random samples included a minimum of 30%
of the lessons from each chapter. For example, we randomly selected
3 lessons when a chapter contained 10 total lessons (30%) and 4 lessons when a chapter contained 11 total lessons (36%). This resulted in
actual samples of 32%–39% of lessons in each textbook and an overall sample of 212 (37%) of the 580 total lessons. Our sampling procedure treated all chapters and lessons equally, even though they may
not all have the same likelihood of being enacted (Tarr et al., 2006).
As stated previously, this choice is based on our goal of characterizing opportunities to reason-and-prove in the textbooks themselves,
not in classroom enactment.
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Table 2. Number of Lessons and Exercises Analyzed in Each Textbook
Textbook

Expository Lessons

Chapter Reviews

Exercises

CME
Glencoe
Holt
Key
Prentice
UCSMP
Total

38
33
31
38
31
41
212

8
13
12
14
12
14
73

1058
2730
2531
1489
2479
2181
12,468

In addition to the expository lessons, we also included in our
analysis one chapter review from each chapter of each textbook. We
viewed chapter reviews as the textbook authors’ sample of important concepts and procedures from the chapter, thus forming a complement to our own random sample of lessons. Several textbooks included more than one chapter review for each chapter, in which case
we selected the one that appeared to be the most comprehensive of
the chapter’s expository content. Table 2 shows the number of sections analyzed for this study.
Analytic Framework
Following the recommendations of other textbook analysts (Li, 2000;
Senk, Thompson, & Johnson, 2008), our study included attention to
both textbook exposition and student exercises because both contribute to the potential opportunities students have to engage with reasoning-and-proving. By textbook exposition, we mean the paragraphs
of narrative text in the body of a lesson as well as the text-boxes that
contain definitions, formulas, theorems, or key ideas. In essence, textbook exposition refers to the portions of a lesson in which the textbook authors are presenting information or ideas for consumption by
a reader. Thus, worked examples (i.e., problems presented along with
an explained solution) were considered to be part of the textbook exposition. By student exercise, we mean an item for which students
are expected to take an active role by answering a question, solving
a problem, or completing a particular task. The majority of student
exercises were located in a separate section of a lesson (i.e., an exercise set) following the textbook exposition, but textbooks did have instances of student exercises interspersed with expository text.
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Thompson and colleagues (2012) developed an analytic framework
based on NCTM’s (2000) reasoning and proof process standard and
the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (Valverde et
al., 2002). This framework formed the basis of our own framework
because it contained dimensions for both textbook exposition (which
they referred to as “narrative”) as well as student exercises, and because it distinguished meaningfully between various types of justifications and reasoning-and-proving activities. For the purposes of
this study, however, it was necessary to make several modifications
to their framework, described in detail next. The first of these modifications was based on the necessity principle (Harel & Tall, 1991)
and our desire to capture the nature of the mathematical statement
around which the reasoning-and-proving opportunities were taking
place. Another modification involved distinguishing between exercises that ask students to “explain” and those that ask students to
“prove,” which for Thompson and colleagues (2012) both fell under
the develop an argument code. Other modifications involved only slight
reinterpretations of existing categories and the inclusion of a few additional categories based on pilot analysis and the work of other researchers. We present our framework in its entirety (see Figure 1),
prior to descriptions of the modifications, to orient the reader for the
explication that follows.

Figure 1. An analytic framework for reasoning-and-proving in geometry textbooks.
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Characterizing Mathematical Statements
The necessity principle (Harel & Tall, 1991) highlights the importance
of not only having students engage in deductive reasoning but also
allowing students to experience the intellectual need for deduction. In
mathematics, claims made about infinite classes of objects call for a
shift away from inductive forms of reasoning that are prevalent outside mathematics. Two clarifications are in order for this interpretation of the necessity principle related to deductive reasoning. First,
a focus on the need for deductive reasoning does not imply that inductive reasoning has no place in mathematical reasoning, but rather
that deductive reasoning also has a place, especially with regard to
the justification of claims about infinite classes as opposed to single
or finite classes (Stylianides & Ball, 2008). Second, the fact that claims
involving infinite classes of mathematical objects have the potential
to intellectually motivate deductive reasoning does not imply that
deduction has no place with regard to finite claims. Indeed, deduction has value and is often used in reasoning about finite situations.
Nonetheless, we are positing an intellectual link, broadly speaking,
between claims involving infinite classes and deductive reasoning.
To capture in our analytic framework the issue of the motivation
for deduction, we developed a category of codes relating to the mathematical statement or situation of reasoning-and-proving opportunities. This consideration of mathematical statements is complementary
to past textbook analyses that focused solely on the activities expected
of students. The codes for mathematical statements are general, particular, and general with particular instantiation provided (see Figure 2).
Note that the inclusion of the words “general” and “particular” in the
latter code is purposeful as this code reflects aspects of both general
and particular situations.
In addition to the necessity principle, the field of logic also provides a rationale for distinguishing between these three types of mathematical statements in textbooks. In logic, if one selects an arbitrary
element from a set, the notion of universal generalization allows for
any conclusions drawn that do not appeal to specific characteristics
of the selected element to be extended to the entire parent set (Hurley, 2006). Indeed, universal generalization is commonplace in mathematical proofs of general claims, as indicated by the typical format of
first lines (e.g., “Let n be a natural number,” “Let ABC be an arbitrary
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Figure 2. Types of mathematical statements for reasoning-and-proving
opportunities.

right triangle”), but it is not required when justifying particular statements. The code of general with particular instantiation provided, then,
captures the fact that general statements in textbooks may be accompanied by a preselected element from the set in question. In such
cases, students do not necessarily have to take the step of universal
generalization themselves but can use the specific element provided
in the textbook. This feature of the written opportunity may be important if students do not realize that universal generalization is possible as they reason with the specific element. As a final point of clarification, it is important to realize that the instantiation referred to in
this code is not a confirming example or diagram being produced as
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an initialization of a justification of a general claim, but rather a particular instance that satisfies the hypothesis stated in the statement
(in geometry, this often does take the form of a diagram), which can
subsequently be used by students in the justification process.
Separating Mathematical Statements from Justifications
The addition of statement-types to our framework allows us to make
a clean separation between statement-type and justification-type. Because general statements and particular statements can both be justified deductively or empirically (although the justifications are not
necessarily valid proofs), we view statement-type and justificationtype as independent dimensions (see Figure 3). To highlight this independence, we use the terms “general” and “particular” to refer exclusively to statements and the terms “deductive” and “empirical” to
refer exclusively to justifications.
To solidify the separation of these dimensions, we depart from
past textbook analyses (e.g., Thompson et al., 2012) by not inferring
the nature of a students’ justification from the nature of the statement
they are justifying. In other words, we did not assume that general

Figure 3. Statement-types and justification-types are independent categories of
analysis.
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statements would be justified in general ways or particular statements
in nongeneral ways, which means that findings related to the statement-type dimension of this analytic framework should not be construed as claims about resultant students’ reasoning. Instead, we used
the following codes to capture the type of justification that a student
exercise called for, if such a call was made explicitly in the text:
• Deductive—the item explicitly calls for a “deductive argument”
or a “logical chain” of justifications;
• Empirical—the item explicitly calls for measurements or confirming examples;
• Implicit—the item asks students to engage in reasoning-andproving (e.g., “Prove . . .” or “Explain why . . .”) but does not
explicitly specify the nature of the argument to be produced.
We acknowledge that, with these definitions, the majority of student exercises will fall in the implicit category with regard to justification type. Nevertheless, we feel that it is important to capture the
reasoning-and-proving opportunities as explicitly represented in textbooks, especially because it is not clear that students interpret directions to “prove” or “show” in the same way that mathematicians or
mathematics educators do. By using the implicit code rather than making assumptions about what students might produce, we are attempting to reduce inference in our analysis and to demarcate our study as
one of textbook opportunities rather than student reasoning.
Separating Opportunities to Prove from Opportunities to Explain
Drawing on Stylianides’ framework (2009) as well as others who have
philosophically distinguished between proof and explanation (Dreyfus, 1999; Sierpinska, 1994), we divided Thompson and colleagues’
(2012) category of develop an argument into two separate categories:
construct a proof and develop a rationale or other non-proof argument.
Within student exercises, we followed Hanna and de Bruyn (1999)
and Bieda (2010) in using keywords as the primary means of distinguishing between these two categories. We associated terms such as
“explain,” “justify,” “show,” or “why” with develop a rationale or other
non-proof argument and terms such as “prove” or “deduce” with construct a proof . Although we admit that it is possible for students to
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respond to an “explain” or “justify” prompt by providing a full mathematical proof—especially for those who recognize that proofs explain
mathematical ideas (Hanna, 1990)—we maintain that the reasoningand-proving opportunities differ and thus reserved the category of
construct a proof for those items in which the textbooks authors chose
to explicitly invoke the notion of proof. For “explain,” we coded only
those items asking students to explain why something was true or
false and not the items asking students to explain without a rationale
the steps they carried out.
Codes Inherited from Thompson, Senk, and Johnson
The following codes from Thompson and colleagues (2012) for expected activity within student exercises were used with only slight
modifications:
• Make a conjecture, refine a mathematical statement, or draw a
conclusion—students are asked to formulate a mathematical
claim or modify a false conjecture into one that the student
believes is true. If students are also asked to support the
resulting claim, an additional code or codes captures this
supporting activity.
• Investigate a conjecture or statement—students are asked
to determine the truth-value of a given conjecture or to
determine the truth-value of something they just conjectured
themselves.
• Evaluate or correct an argument or proof—an argument or proof is
presented and students are asked to determine whether it is
valid or to find the error(s) and correct them.
• Find a counterexample to a mathematical claim—students are
asked to supply a counterexample that disproves a given
mathematical claim.
With respect to exposition, there were also several codes from
Thompson and colleagues (2012) that we included in our framework
with minimal modification (e.g., renaming):
• Deductive justification—the textbook provides a logical
argument building on definitions, postulates, or previously
established results to support or prove a mathematical claim.
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• Empirical justification—the textbook provides a confirming
example to a mathematical claim or infers the truth of the
claim from a subset of the relevant cases.
• Justification left to student—rather than providing a justification
in the textbook exposition, it is explicitly stated that students
will be providing the justification (e.g., later in the exercise
set).
• No justification—there is no justification for a given
mathematical claim in the textbook exposition, and it is
not explicitly stated that students will later produce a
justification.
Codes Added Based on Pilot Analysis of Geometry Textbooks
Because reasoning-and-proving was expected to be more prevalent in
geometry textbooks than other areas, we conducted pilot analysis and
added the following categories of justification for textbook exposition:
• Outline—the textbook exposition contains an outline of a proof
or the key step of a proof that would establish the truth of a
mathematical claim.
• Past or future—rather than providing a justification in the textbook exposition, it is explicitly stated that a proof or other
form of justification can be found in a past lesson or course,
a future lesson or course, or somewhere external to the textbook (e.g., the Internet).
Within student exercises, we added the following categories of expected reasoning-and-proving activity:
• Fill in the blanks of a conjecture—students are asked to complete
a mathematical conjecture for which a portion is already
provided.
• Outline—students are asked to provide an outline of a proof or
to write a full proof from a given outline.
• Fill in the blanks of an argument or proof —students are provided
with a partial argument or proof and are asked to fill in the
missing components, thus forming a complete argument or
proof.
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Statements or Exercises About Reasoning-and-Proving
The final component of our analytic framework involved capturing
the opportunities embedded in the geometry textbooks to reflect on
or think about reasoning-and-proving as a mathematical practice.
Following Hanna and de Bruyn (1999), who identified discussions
about proof as separate from the act of proving, we coded statements
about reasoning-and-proving and exercises about reasoning-and-proving as elements of textbook exposition and student exercises, respectively. These statements are pertinent to code because (a) geometry
textbooks are perhaps the most likely place in school mathematics
for reasoning-and-proving to become an explicit object of reflection,
(b) many student difficulties around reasoning-and-proving involve
the conception of the process itself, and (c) helping students become
aware of the intellectual need for mathematical proof and deductive
forms of reasoning, an aim suggested by the necessity principle, may
involve giving students opportunities to reflect on the process rather
than only engaging in it. Examples of this code involve the form of
mathematical proofs (e.g., two-column proofs, flow proofs), the methods of proof (e.g., proof by contradiction) or forms of reasoning (e.g.,
inductive versus deductive), and explanations of strategies for constructing a proof (e.g., work backward). We recognize that many opportunities to reflect on reasoning-and-proving may be embedded in
the teacher’s guides rather than the student editions, but that is beyond the scope of the present study.
Having described the various components of the framework, we
refer the reader back to Figure 1 for a visual depiction.
Analytic Procedures
Within each of the 212 lessons in our sample, we identified any expository mathematical statements such as theorems, postulates,
properties, formulas, identities, or other claims of a mathematical
truth (e.g., that a given diagram has a certain property). Mathematical definitions were not coded, but worked examples that included
a prompt for reasoning-and-proving were coded as exposition. The
statements included in analysis were then coded for their statementtype and their justification-type, with multiple codes being assigned
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if a single statement was justified multiple times. To check reliability, we performed double coding on a 20% subsample of lessons that
yielded 95% agreement on statement-type and 91% agreement on justification-type within textbook exposition. It should be noted that, although postulates cannot be proven deductively, we included them in
our analysis because they are mathematical claims and have interesting implications when considering the role of deductive arguments in
establishing claims as true—postulates are accepted as true without
deductive justification. This choice to include postulates means our
analysis included more instances of no justification or empirical justification in textbook exposition than if we had excluded postulates,
so we report postulates separately in the results.
For student exercises in the sampled lessons and chapter reviews,
the reasoning-and-proving framework was taken to be exhaustive of
the types of reasoning-and-proving items. In other words, if an item
did not fall into one of the categories of reasoning-and-proving activity in Figure 1, we did not include it in our analysis.3 Examples of
excluded items were those asking students to determine unknown
measures in a given diagram, solve length or area problems, or identify geometric entities such as medians or orthocenters. Exercises that
did involve at least one of the reasoning-and-proving activities, then,
were subsequently coded for that activity as well as the type of mathematical statement involved and the type of justification expected.
The unit of analysis was items as partitioned by numbers or letters
in the textbook. So, for example, an exercise with parts a–d was considered as four separate items. A single item, however, could receive
multiple codes if it involved multiple reasoning-and-proving activities (e.g., investigate a conjecture and provide a rationale). The reliability check in the case of student exercises yielded 92% agreement
on statement-type and 93% agreement on activity-type. Because implicit codes were so prevalent for justification-type (as expected), results along this dimension are not reported in the results.
3. It is important to note that our analytic framework excludes patterning exercises
(e.g., determine the hundredth entry in a given pattern) from reasoning-andproving, although Stylianides (2009) and Davis (2010) included such exercises in
their studies of reform-oriented curricula. If, however, a geometry textbook asked
students to conjecture or prove a statement based on a pattern, we included the
item as reasoning-and-proving.
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With respect to items about reasoning and proving, exercises of this
sort were coded but did not receive any other codes. Within textbook
exposition, based on pilot analysis and issues of reliability, the unit of
analysis for these codes was not the sentence level or the paragraph
level but the theme level. For example, if multiple sentences were
dealing with the same theme with respect to reasoning-and-proving, we assigned a single code, but if a paragraph contained two separable points relating to the practice of reasoning-and-proving, we
coded two instances.

Results
In presenting the results, we first describe the reasoning-and-proving
opportunities embedded in the geometry textbooks with respect to
textbook exposition and then with respect to student exercises (RQ1).
Generally speaking, opportunities to reason-and-prove were found
to be more numerous than in textbooks for other levels of areas of
mathematics but not as numerous as one might expect given the traditional link between reasoning-and-proving and geometry. The frequencies of opportunities to construct a proof and to think about reasoning-and-proving were especially low.
Next, we present an analysis of similarities and differences across
the exposition and exercises with regard to the nature of reasoningand-proving opportunities in these two contexts (RQ2). The most
striking result in this case was that general mathematical statements
constitute the majority of reasoning-and-proving items in exposition,
but particular statements were more common in student exercises.
Moreover, when general statements did appear in exercises, a substantial portion of them came with a particular instantiation provided,
which has implications for the intellectual necessity of proof and the
steps of deductive reasoning.
For the results overall, reasoning-and-proving opportunities are
treated in aggregate for entire textbooks, but this is not to say that the
opportunities were distributed evenly over the chapters of the textbooks. Elsewhere (Otten, Males, & Gilbertson, in press) we take up
this specific issue through an analysis of the opportunities in certain
chapters in contrast to others.
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Reasoning-and-Proving in Textbook Exposition
Table 3 reports for each textbook the frequency of reasoning-andproving items appearing in the expository sections, such as theorems,
postulates, certain worked examples, or statements about reasoningand-proving. However, direct comparison of frequencies between
the textbooks are problematic for a variety of reasons, and we therefore turn to more detailed results of reasoning-and-proving in textbook exposition.
Types of Statements in Textbook Exposition
Table 4 shows the types of mathematical statements that appeared related to reasoning-and-proving in textbook exposition. General statements were prevalent in the exposition sections of all six textbooks.
Table 3. Frequency of Reasoning-and-Proving Items in Textbook Exposition
Textbook

No. of Expository
Lessons Analyzed

No. of Reasoning-andProving Items

Reasoning-and-Proving
Items per Lesson

CME
Glencoe
Holt
Key
Prentice
UCSMP

38
33
31
38
31
41

95
172
154
130
138
218

2.5
5.2
5.0
3.4
4.5
5.3

Note: Chapter reviews are not included as expository lessons.

Table 4. Types of Statements in Textbook Exposition

Textbook
CME
Glencoe
Holt
Key
Prentice
UCSMP

No. of General Statements (%)
Non-Postulate
Postulate
69 (64)
109 (63)
94 (61)
73 (56)
87 (63)
146 (67)

8 (8)
10 (6)
8 (5)
35* (27)
16 (12)
11 (5)

No. of Particular No. of Statements About
Statements (%) Reasoning- and-Proving (%)
13 (14)
45 (26)
37 (24)
8 (6)
28 (20)
20 (9)

13 (14)
8 (5)
15 (10)
14 (11)
7 (5)
41 (19)

* Approximately half of Key’s postulates came from a single lesson that listed postulates
from algebra and related postulates in geometry.
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In Key, 83% of statements were general in nature while only 6% were
about particular objects or situations. Even in Glencoe and Holt,
where the percentage of general statements was the lowest, there
were still more than two general statements for every one particular
statement. Key (6%), UCSMP (9%), and CME (14%) had relatively few
statements of a particular nature in their expository sections.
In all books, particular statements related to reasoning-and-proving were predominantly worked examples. For example, Prentice contained a worked example of a proof about a particular quadrilateral
(see Figure 4) that used the Hypotenuse-leg theorem, introduced earlier in the same expository section.
There was variability between textbooks in the frequency of statements about the practice of reasoning-and-proving. UCSMP had
the highest percentage of such statements (19%), with an average
of 1 statement about reasoning-and-proving every lesson. An example of such a statement from UCSMP is when the textbook authors
pointed out “the difference between proof and disproof ” (p. 96, emphasis in original) in that the latter only requires one counterexample, whereas the former requires more than confirming examples. In
a later chapter, following a worked example that contained a proof,
UCSMP also noted that “[t]he last statement of the proof in Example
2 is imperative. . . . You must justify why your calculations prove the
statement that is to be proved” (p. 671). Holt (10%) had 1 statement
about reasoning-and-proving every 2 lessons and both Key (11%) and
CME (14%) had approximately 1 such statement every 3 lessons. For
Glencoe (5%) and Prentice (5%), these averages were 1 for every 4–5
lessons.

Figure 4. A worked example adapted from Prentice (p. 237) containing a particular statement being proved deductively.
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Types of Justifications in Textbook Exposition
With the exception of statements about the practice of reasoning-andproving, each reasoning-and-proving item in the textbook exposition
was coded for the type of justification provided (see Table 5). Deductive arguments were used to justify 42% of the reasoning-and-proving items in UCSMP and 36% of the items in both Holt and Prentice.
Glencoe employed deductive justifications 30% of the time and CME
did so 27% of the time. Key was the only textbook to use empirical
arguments (55%) more frequently than deductive arguments (19%),
although CME had a nearly even split with 24% empirical to 27% deductive. Holt and Glencoe were the least likely to give empirical arguments at 9% and 16%, respectively, but they were also the most likely
to leave the justification to the student (26% and 34%, respectively).
In addition to deductive and empirical arguments, the other primary justification codes were no justification or explicitly stating that
the students would be expected to supply an argument. Glencoe left
the justification to students most often (34%), whereas Key (5%) and
UCSMP (4%) did so least often. Key was the least likely textbook to
omit a justification, doing so for only 9% of the reasoning-and-proving statements. The other five textbooks omitted justifications approximately 20%–30% of the time. When interpreting the omission of justifications, one should refer to Table 4 to the number of postulates
coded in each textbook because these were usually and understandably presented without justification. In some instances (particularly
in Key), however, empirical support for a postulate was given or a
reference was made to the students having learned the postulate in
a past course.

Table 5. Percentages of Justification-Types in Textbook Exposition
Textbook

Deductive
Argument

CME
Glencoe
Holt
Key
Prentice
UCSMP

27
30
36
19
36
42

Empirical 		
Argument
Outline
24
16
9
55
26
24

5
0
0
3
2
1

Left to
Student

Past or
Future

Not
Justified

17
34
26
5
14
4

12
8
7
15
8
13

28
17
25
9
24
27

Note: Rows sum to more than 100 because a statement may be justified in multiple ways.
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Summary
The six geometry textbooks contain approximately 2.5 to 5 reasoning-and-proving statements per expository lesson. Of these reasoning-and-proving statements, roughly three-quarters involved a general class of mathematical objects (e.g., theorems or formulas), that
is, the types of statements that arguably lay the foundation for pedagogy that necessitates deductive forms of reasoning. There were
relatively few statements of a particular nature in the textbook exposition, and when such statements did occur they were usually in
the form of worked examples. Justifications in the textbook exposition were divided fairly evenly between deductive arguments, empirical arguments, left-to-student, and no justification. Exceptions to
this relatively even distribution of justifications were the following:
Holt, which tended not to employ empirical arguments; Key, which
employed many empirical arguments; and UCSMP, which provided
more deductive arguments and left less to the students than the other
textbooks.
Reasoning-and-Proving in Student Exercises
Our analysis validated the assumption that reasoning-and-proving is
most prevalent in secondary-level geometry as reasoning-and-proving exercises constituted one-fifth to two-fifths of the total student
exercises, which is a substantially higher portion than found in other
areas (Davis, 2010; Thompson et al., 2012; Stylianides, 2009). Table 6
contains frequencies of reasoning-and-proving exercises in each of
the textbooks.
Table 6. Frequency of Reasoning-and-Proving Exercises

Textbook

No. of
Lessons
Analyzed

No. of
Exercises
Analyzed

No. of Reasoningand-Proving
Exercises (%)

Reasoning-andProving Exercises
per Lesson

CME
Glencoe
Holt
Key
Prentice
UCSMP

46
46
43
52
43
55

1058
2730
2531
1489
2479
2181

400 (38)
663 (24)
597 (24)
397 (27)
484 (20)
601 (28)

8.7
14.4
13.9
7.6
11.3
10.9

Note. Lessons in this table include chapter reviews.
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CME, which had the lowest frequency of reasoning-and-proving
statements in exposition, had the highest percentage of reasoning-andproving exercises (38%), whereas Prentice had the lowest percentage
(20%). Glencoe and Holt, the textbooks with the most total exercises
(see Table 2), had the highest frequencies of reasoning-and-proving
exercises per lesson at 14.4 and 13.9, respectively. Key and CME, the
textbooks with the least exercises analyzed, had the lowest frequencies per lesson (7.6 and 8.7, resp.). Note throughout this section that,
as noted previously, these exercises only represent potential opportunities to engage in reasoning-and-proving as there can be great variability between and within textbooks with respect to the exercises actually assigned by teachers and actually completed by students.
Types of Statements in Student Exercises
As Table 7 shows, particular statements were prevalent in the exercises of all six textbooks. In Holt, 72% of reasoning-and-proving exercises involved a particular mathematical statement. For example,
in Holt (p. 324), students were asked to show that, within the triangle
with vertices of (–6, 11), (6, –3), and (–2, –5), the segment connecting
the midpoints of two sides of the triangle is parallel to and half the
length of the third side; this exercise involves reasoning only around
that specific triangle. Similarly, Prentice, Glencoe, and UCSMP included particular statements in approximately 60%–65% of reasoning-and-proving exercises. Figure 5 depicts an example of a particular statement in a proof exercise from Glencoe. Key and CME, on
the other hand, approximated a balanced split between general statements and particular statements.
Table 7. Types of Statements in Reasoning-and-Proving Exercises

Textbook

No. of
General
Statements (%)

No. of
Particular
Statements (%)

No. of General
Statements with
Instantiation (%)

No. of Exercises
about Reasoningand-Proving (%)

CME
Glencoe
Holt
Key
Prentice
UCSMP

181 (45)
180 (27)
117 (20)
174 (44)
130 (27)
214 (36)

206 (52)
398 (60)
430 (72)
190 (48)
315 (65)
351 (58)

9 (2)
68 (10)
33 (5)
20 (5)
37 (8)
22 (4)

4 (1)
17 (3)
17 (3)
13 (3)
2 (0)
14 (2)
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Figure 5. An adapted example of a particular statement in a reasoning-and-proving exercise from Glencoe (p. 155).

A modest number of exercises involved reasoning-and-proving
around a general statement with a particular instantiation provided
by the textbook. For instance, Holt asked students to prove the Exterior Angle theorem, which is stated generally, but then provided a
particular labeled diagram for students to work with (see Figure 6).
The category of general statements with particular instantiation becomes more noteworthy when one compares it with the number of
general statements rather than the total number of reasoning-andproving exercises. Specifically, of the reasoning-and-proving exercises
in Glencoe, Prentice, and Holt that involved some form of general
mathematical statement, 27%, 22%, and 22% provided a particular
instantiation for the students to reason with, respectively. As for exercises about the practice of reasoning-and-proving, none of the textbooks exceeded 3% of reasoning-and-proving exercises being of this
variety. In terms of total exercises analyzed, the portion is less than
1 in 180 exercises.
Types of Reasoning-and-Proving Activities in Student Exercises
Past studies of reasoning-and-proving in textbooks focused on the
types of activities expected of students. Table 8 follows this convention by depicting the percentages of various reasoning-and- proving

Figure 6. An adapted example of a general exercise with a particular instantiation
provided in the Holt textbook (p. 229).
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Table 8. Percentages of Activity-Types in Reasoning-and-Proving Exercises
Textbook
CME
Glencoe
Holt
Key
Prentice
UCSMP

Construct Develop a
a Proof
Rationale
25
28
13
13
15
14

36
48
42
52
54
44

Find a
Counterexample

Investigate a Make a
Statement Conjecture

7
4
4
26
1
3

44
30
39
42
46
36

16
17
8
20
19
14

Other
3
5
16
6
11
5

Note: Rows sum to more than 100 because an exercise may involve multiple activities.

activities found in the six geometry textbooks we examined. Note that
Table 8 should be interpreted with regard to Table 6 because the latter indicates how many reasoning-and-proving items were identified
overall, which form the basis of the percentages in Table 8.
In four of the textbooks, 13%–15% of their reasoning-and-proving
exercises (or 3%–4% of their total exercises) involved students constructing a proof. In CME and Glencoe, proof comprised 25% and 28%
of their reasoning-and-proving exercises, respectively (or 9% and 7%
of their total exercises). The most common reasoning-and-proving activities were to investigate a statement (i.e., determine the truth-value
of a mathematical claim) and to develop a rationale (i.e., to explain or
justify an answer or result in a manner that is not necessarily a proof).
With the exception of Holt (8%), approximately 15%–20% of reasoning-and-proving exercises involved students making a conjecture.
Statement-Types of Proof-Focused Exercises
It is worthwhile to consider the interaction between activity-type and
statement-type in student exercises, particularly with regard to exercises that deal explicitly with proof, captured by the following codes:
construct a proof, outline a proof or construct a proof given an outline, fillin-the-blanks of an argument or proof, and evaluate or correct an argument
or proof. Of these explicitly proof-focused exercises, Figure 7 depicts
the breakdown of general statements, particular statements, and general statements with particular instantiations provided.
Prentice, Holt, and UCSMP had approximately two-thirds of
proof-focused exercises take place around particular statements.
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Figure 7. Percentages of statements-types of those reasoning-and-proving exercises
explicitly focusing on proof.

Furthermore, within these three textbooks, a sizeable portion of the
nonparticular statements were presented with a particular instantiation for the student to reason with, removing the need for students to
engage in the step of universal generalization. In CME and Glencoe,
approximately one-half of proof-focused exercises took place around
particular statements, although Glencoe provided more particular instantiations for general statements than did CME. Key stood out as
having the lowest percentage of particular proof-focused exercises
(29%), but it also had the highest percentage of proof-focused exercises in which a particular instantiation was provided for a general
statement (25%).
Summary
Most reasoning-and-proving exercises took place around particular
mathematical statements rather than general statements, and of the
general statements a sizeable portion had particular instantiations
provided for students. In both the particular and general-with-particular-instantiation-provided situations, reasoning can occur around
a single or finite number of cases and so deductive reasoning is not
necessitated to the same degree as with general statements. It should
be noted, however, that Key and CME approached a balanced split
between general and particular statements. The most common reasoning-and-proving activities asked of students were determining
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the truth-value of a mathematical claim and providing explanations
or other nonproof justifications of mathematical statements. In two
books (CME and Glencoe) at least one-quarter of the reasoning-andproving exercises asked students to construct a proof; in the other
books, such items comprised only 13%–15% of the reasoning-andproving items. Of the exercises explicitly dealing with proof, all textbooks except Key were more likely to have such exercises involve a
particular mathematical statement than a general one.
Comparing Textbook Exposition to Student Exercises
Although it is possible for textbook exposition to be enacted in such
a way that students actively participate in developing the expository material—indeed, this seems to be the intention behind the design of CME (Cuoco, 2007) and Key (Key Curriculum Press, 2008)—
it remains reasonable to assume that students will, to some extent,
be readers or recipients of the expository content. By the same token,
one might expect students to take a more active part in the written
exercises than in the textbook exposition. Because of this distinction,
we turn our attention in this section to a comparison between the results of the textbook exposition and the student exercises.
Figure 8 compares textbook exposition and student exercises with
respect to the percentage of reasoning-and-proving items that were
general in nature for each portion of the textbook. For example, in

Figure 8. The nature of mathematical statements in textbook exposition versus student exercises.
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CME, 73% of reasoning-and-proving items in the exposition involved
general statements, whereas 45% of reasoning-and-proving exercises
involved such statements. Figure 8 reveals a stark contrast between
the types of mathematical statements represented in the textbook exposition and those in the student exercises: at least two-thirds of the
reasoning-and-proving items in the exposition, and as many as fourfifths were general in nature. In contrast, less than half and even as
little as one-fifth of the statements within the reasoning-and-proving
exercises were general. Furthermore, when particular statements did
appear in expository sections they were usually in the form of worked
examples (see Figure 6, for example), which may be interpreted as the
textbook authors presenting what would otherwise be considered a
student exercise. Conversely, when general statements appeared in
student exercises, they were often accompanied by a particular instantiation of the general claim, which does not lay the same foundation for adherence to the necessity principle. In other words, the gap
between statement-types in exposition versus exercises grows rather
than shrinks when we consider nuanced factors such as worked examples and particular instantiations.
Of the mathematical claims presented in textbook expositions,
many were justified deductively but many were also justified empirically. Within the exercises, the type of justification to be provided by
the student was most often left implicit. If we assume that students
interpret “prove” to be calling for a deductive argument, then there
were a fair number of opportunities for students to develop deductive arguments. “Explain” exercises, however, were much more common than “prove” exercises and it is unclear whether students interpret prompts to explain as opportunities to employ a deductive line of
reasoning. Also with regard to justification, five textbooks’ exposition
included no justification for approximately one-quarter of their mathematical statements, although some of these were likely postulates.
(In Key, this was true for only 9% of such statements.) Similarly, there
were many exercises that asked students to make a conjecture or determine the truth-value of a mathematical claim without also asking
the students to explain, justify, or prove that claim. For example, in
Key, students were asked to complete the following statement, which
Key referred to as a conjecture: “If two angles are both congruent and
supplementary, then ? ” (p. 125). They were not asked to justify this
conjecture. Many textbooks gave sets of claims and asked students
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to decide if they were always true, sometimes true, or never true, but
did not require a justification for these decisions (although at other
times, they may have been accompanied by requests for justification).
Finally, concerning statements or exercises about the practice of
reasoning-and-proving, there was strong similarity between the expository sections and the student exercises in that such opportunities were rare in both places. Less than one-quarter of the analyzed
expository lessons contained even a single comment about reasoning-and-proving as a mathematical practice. Only UCSMP had a sizeable number of such statements, with at least one appearing in 40%
of their sampled lessons. Likewise, less than 0.6% of the analyzed exercises asked students to reflect on or write about the reasoning-andproving process. These frequencies may be viewed as low for secondary-level geometry texts because this is typically the setting in school
mathematics where students learn about the reasoning process and
mathematical proof most explicitly.

Discussion
In this article, we have shared results of an investigation of the reasoning-and-proving opportunities embedded in six different U.S.
geometry textbooks. Overall, approximately one-quarter of the textbook exercises analyzed asked students to engage in reasoning-andproving activities, and the construction of a proof was entailed in
less than 5%. These percentages are higher than have been found in
even the most proof-focused sections of U.S. algebra and pre-calculus textbooks (Thompson et al., 2012), a middle school textbook series (Stylianides, 2009), and an integrated high school textbook series (Davis, 2010). For geometry, however, which typically represents
the high point of reasoning-and-proving opportunities in the school
curriculum (Hanna & de Bruyn, 1999; Herbst, 2002), these quantities of reasoning-and-proving opportunities may be viewed as limited in light of the calls for reasoning-and-proving to be integral to
the school mathematics curriculum (NCTM, 2000, 2009; NGA & CCSSO, 2010) and the fact that proof specifically is present in 24% of the
Common Core State Standards geometry standards (Kosko & Herbst,
2011). Moreover, deductive arguments were provided for less than
half the claims coded in textbook exposition, which extends a finding
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of Thompson and colleagues (2012) in nongeometry textbooks, where
approximately 30% of expository properties were justified deductively. The scope of our study, however, does not allow for inferences
to be made with regard to ideal proportions of certain kinds of reasoning-and-proving opportunities, and as the design of our analytic
framework has emphasized, it is important to consider not only the
quantity of the reasoning-and-proving opportunities but their quality in terms of helping students see the intellectual need for this important mathematical practice.
With the exception of UCSMP, statements or questions about reasoning-and-proving as a mathematical practice were rare. Such opportunities have the potential to not only allow students to reflect on
the nature of their mathematical activity but also to develop metacognitive skills that have been shown to be important in the reasoning-and-proving process (Schoenfeld, 1992; Weber, 2001). This scarcity
suggests students’ opportunities, as reflected in curriculum materials,
to actively engage in reasoning-and-proving outweigh their opportunities to reflect on reasoning-and-proving. Hence it becomes even
more important to examine the nature of the opportunities to actively
reason-and-prove. Are such experiences representative of the disciplinary practice of reasoning-and-proving? Do they lay a foundation
for pedagogy that adheres to the necessity principle with respect to
deductive reasoning? These questions stretch beyond the specific U.S.
context of the present study.
The most common reasoning-and-proving activities were providing a rationale (not necessarily a proof) and determining the truthvalue of a mathematical claim.4 That is, students had many more
opportunities to make judgments about the truth of a claim than
they did to provide deductive arguments—the disciplinary process
by which truth is established. From the perspective of the necessity
principle (Harel & Tall, 1991), it may be insufficient to ask students
4 With respect to the prominence of rationale exercises, one might contend that an
“explain” prompt provides students with an opportunity to construct a proof
because a key function of mathematical proofs is explanation (de Villiers, 1995;
Hanna, 1995). This leads to the question, however, of whether students realize
that a proof would be an effective response to a rationale exercise. Answering this
question would take us beyond the realm of textbook analysis, although we can
note that Herbst and Brach (2006) found that geometry students viewed proof
tasks to be distinct from explanation tasks.

Otten et al. in Mathematical Thinking and Learning, 16 (2014)

33

to frequently indicate the truth or falsity of mathematical statements,
and presumably come to conviction about that truth or falsity, without also providing a justification or with only a prompt for a nonrigorous explanation.
This is not to say that there was a complete absence of opportunities to engage in the development of deductive justifications. These opportunities, however, were most commonly around a particular mathematical statement or, at other times, around a general statement with
a particular instantiation provided. Such exercises, we contend, do not
necessitate deductive forms of reasoning to the same extent as exercises
around general statements.5 When a student is faced with a particular
diagram of parallel lines cut by a transversal, for example, and is asked
to show that a specific angle in the given diagram measures 40°, it is not
unreasonable to approach this situation by using a protractor to measure the angle in question. Indeed, this approach makes a great deal of
sense if the context were the practical world. Mathematics, however, is
unique in its concern for general claims—in this case, assertions about
any pair of parallel lines cut by an arbitrary transversal—where inductive reasoning falters and deductive reasoning is needed.
Much of the existing literature on students’ abilities and conceptions with respect to reasoning-and-proving is consonant with our
finding that particular statements are prevalent in student exercises.
For example, although there are exercises that ask students to prove
or justify mathematical claims, the paucity of exercises that necessitate deductive forms of reasoning suggests that students, even after
their secondary-level geometry course, may have difficulty producing
proofs and may continue to rely on empirical forms of reasoning (e.g.,
Chazan, 1993; Harel & Sowder, 2007; Herbst & Brach, 2006; Selden &
Selden, 2003). Moreover, this may partially explain why Senk (1985)
found in her large-scale study of proof performance among U.S. geometry students that students were more successful in proving particular statements than general statements.
5 These proof opportunities around particular statements, although they may
achieve many of the state standards for proof in geometry, do not seem to align
with the new proof standards as outline in the Common Core State Standards (NGA
& CCSSO, 2010). As Kosko and Herbst (2011) noted, the Common Core proof standards often relate to important pieces of content in such a way that these standards are not likely to be met with “token proof exercises whose conclusions are
not memorable” (p. 7).
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Herbst and Brach (2006), in a study of geometry students, found
that students were more confident that they would be accountable for
proving a statement presented in Given-Prove format than for proving a general statement such as “a line through the midpoints of two
sides of a triangle is parallel to the third side and half its length” (p.
84). Furthermore, the students in their study tended not to accept responsibility for proving propositions that contained key mathematical ideas, such as those that we found predominantly in textbook exposition. Moreover, Soucy McCrone and Martin (2009) interviewed
geometry students who reported that the purpose of proof is merely
to apply recently learned theorems. If these students had been using
a textbook from this study, their perception is justifiable—we found
it to be uncommon for students to have opportunities to prove important mathematical results but typical for them to have opportunities to use established theorems to prove something about particular situations.
One might argue that it is necessary for key mathematical results
(i.e., general statements) to be explicated in expository sections so that
they may be officially recognized in the classroom canon and, moreover, that it is necessary to provide students with numerous particular statements to prove because practice is essential and there are not
enough relevant general statements to allow for an adequate amount
of reasoning-and-proving practice. In response to these points, we
would draw attention to the fact that this is essentially an argument
in favor of the status quo with respect to reasoning-and-proving instruction, and the research as well as the policy documents we have
cited in this article indicate that the current state of reasoning-andproving in geometry is not producing the student outcomes that the
international mathematics education community hopes to see. In the
end, our collective goal is not only for students to have success with
reasoning-and-proving but also to see its intellectual necessity and
its value in mathematics.
We wish to explicitly state that none of the textbook trends identified in this study are inherently good, bad, beneficial, or problematic. With respect to statement types, although reasoning-and-proving around particular statements may not necessitate deduction to
the same degree as general statements, they may provide rich opportunities for teachers to help students see the general in the particular
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(Mason & Pimm, 1984) and “think big” even as they are “talking
small” (Cuoco, Goldenberg, & Mark, 1996, p. 384). Particular statements can form a basis for enacting meaningful shifts to more general types of reasoning. As Reid and Knipping (2010) pointed out,
proofs in geometry often fall between generic arguments, wherein an
example represents a larger class, and symbolic arguments, wherein
words and abstract symbols represent the class, because in geometry
there is often a reliance on a specific diagram. This intersection of argument-types relates to the statement-type that we coded as general
statements accompanied by particular instantiations. Although such
opportunities to reason-and-prove open up the possibility of students
omitting the logical step of universal generalization, they can be enacted in productive ways to draw attention to precisely that issue of
selecting an arbitrary element with which to reason about an entire
set. This process may help students develop the habit of “thinking
small” as they “talk big” (Cuoco et al., 1996). Moreover, this study
examined only proportions of various types of opportunities and did
not attend to the sequencing of activities, which may be important
with regard to students’ learning of reasoning-and-proving. Nonetheless, rather than ascribing value to the written opportunities, we
are claiming in this article that an awareness of the nature of such reasoning-and-proving opportunities is important both for teachers, researchers, and curriculum developers. Moreover, students may benefit from having explicit discussions about these issues.
In conclusion, this study makes two primary contributions to the
research on reasoning-and-proving in school mathematics textbooks.
First, by characterizing the nature and extent of reasoning-and-proving opportunities in U.S. geometry textbooks, this study complements the work that has already been done outside of geometry (Davis, 2010; Stylianides, 2009; Thompson et al., 2012). Second, we have
used the necessity principle to guide the development of a refined
framework for textbook analysis that takes into account the types of
mathematical statements within reasoning-and-proving opportunities. Future research may use this refined framework to investigate
the reasoning-and-proving opportunities in content areas other than
geometry or in contexts other than the United States. We have also
identified apparent consonances between our findings and existing
research on students’ performance and conceptions with respect to
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reasoning-and-proving, but research focused on the links between
reasoning-and-proving opportunities in curriculum materials and the
reasoning-and-proving activities of the enacted and attained curriculum is required to empirically confirm these connections.
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